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SOME FUNDAMENTALS OF THE FRENCH POLICY IN THE ARCTIC
Despise a long tradition of research in the Arctic region, French policy in the Arctic in appearance 
seems to be running backwards. President of the French Republic François Hollande presented 
France’s roadmap during the Arctic Circle in November 2015 in Reykjavik with the main objective 
being to increase the French Arctic presence in the political, diplomatic and scientifi c arenas. Th e 
formalised Arctic policy is based on four aspects with the environmental issue in the background: 
political, scientifi c, economic and environmental. Th e policy of France in the Arctic is integrated into 
those of its allies such as the German Federal Republic and the European Union with numerous close 
synergies. Th e sciences are one major key-dimension of French diplomacy in the Arctic. Refs 22.
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Th e French policy in the Arctic was characterised by apparent contradictions and by 
the seeming absence of a tangible policy until the presentation of the French Arctic road-
map policy at the Arctic Circle in Reykjavik in Iceland on the 16th October 2015 by his 
Excellence François Hollande, the President of the French Republic. Offi  cially presented 
the 14 May 2016 by Michel Rocard, the French strategic policy is currently under imple-
mentation and constitutes one of the bases of the Conference of United Nations on the 
Climate 21 (COP 21) of December 2015 in Paris. French Arctic policy is partially driven 
by the COP 21 and the Grenelle 1’s French environmental law [1]. French policy in the 
Arctic lags behind other countries such as Germany, the USA, Poland and Canada. Th is 
constitutes an advantage for France because it allows her to take into account the policies 
developed by other States in conforming to the synthesis policy defi ned with the Euro-
pean Union, by the United States and the European partners as Norway and Germany. 
Th e delay in elaborating a tangible Arctic French policy is hindersome because, despite 
awareness and interest since the end of 2000’s France, in comparison to Germany, seems 
invisible despite a long and permanent history of scientifi c activity in the Arctic, economic 
interests related to oil, gas and natural resource exploitation, fi sheries, and political de-
velopments since March 2009 with the nomination of an Ambassador for the Arctic, Mr 
Michel Rocard, a former French Prime Minister. 
1. Fundamentals of the French policy in the Arctic
1.1. Sustainable development and environment
French policy on the Arctic was defi ned by the European Union: policy focused on 
global warming regulations, environmental issues, sustainable development of territories 
and populations, sustainable exploitation of natural resources and regional cooperation. 
Th e main initial idea was to combine the exploitation of the natural resources with the 
protection of the environment, the protection of native populations with sustainable de-
velopment. Despite Norwegian opposition to Michel Rocard’s proposals, this policy has 
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been promoted by the Norwegian government [3]. Exploitation of natural resource as
off -shore gas and oil can be combined with high-tech technologies, protection of the en-
vironment and sustainable development of local populations. Th e common approach be-
tween French policy and the European Union can be explained by the political achieve-
ments of  Michel Rocard, as deputy member of the European parliament, who defi ned the 
EU Arctic policy of 2008 [2], and is representing French interests in the Arctic as Ambas-
sador. Since the end of 2015, French policy has been advocating non-exploitation of fossil 
natural resources and the exploration of renewable ones [4]. 
Th is pillar of French diplomacy is based on the consideration of the strategic impor-
tance of the Arctic in terms of environmental issues in the late 2000s. Th e nomination 
of an Ambassador for the Arctic issues with the establishment of a diplomatic team in 
the Arctic, more focused attention from the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, and diplomats 
responsible for monitoring Arctic policy in concerned embassies express the growing 
interest of France on the Arctic region since 2006. France is only third country which 
has a permanent representative to Greenland, a dependency of the Embassy of France in 
Denmark. Th e French Republic is also the only none-Arctic State to have an Ambassador 
for the Arctic in charge for the negotiations’ in Polar Regions: Arctic and Antarctic. Both 
Polar territories are managed by the same diplomatic unit. 
1.2. Science policy and climate change studies: drivers of French Arctic diplomacy
Th e second aspect of French policy in the Arctic concerns the central question of 
climate change and environmental impacts caused by global warming. Th is is a central 
keynote of French diplomacy or of French science-diplomacy.
Global warming and environmental issues in the Arctic are focal points of the United 
Nations Climate Change Conference 21 (COP 21) held in December 2015 in Paris. Inter-
actions with the proposals of the European Union on the Arctic are evident (cf. 1.1). Th e 
synergies with the German policy on the Arctic are strong, especially in the scientifi c do-
main.  It establishes joint key-points of the French policy in the Arctic. France, Germany, 
China, the United Kingdom, as non-territorial Arctic States have implemented similar 
policy approaches with a common tool and objective: science constitutes the diplomatic 
foundations of their state policies in the Arctic area. All these countries are transferring 
a part of the scientifi c and academic competences acquired in Antarctica to the Arctic 
region: both poles have symmetric deep impacts from global climatic change; the un-
derstanding and modelling of the climatic dynamics constitute the priority of France’s 
scientifi c programmes. 
Th e third base of French policy in Arctic concerns mobilisation of the scientifi c and 
academic community working in the Arctic region. Th e idea is to centralise and structure 
a large part of the research in geosciences and environmental sciences, in process or under 
construction by the network of the Chantiers arctiques [5]. Th is network brings together 
a large part of the scientists and academics working on questions of the climate change 
in Arctic and in geophysics [6].  French scientists’ and academics’ groups are working 
in more than 20 research programs supported by governmental scientifi c institutions on 
permafrost, biodiversity and ecosystem, climate-atmosphere-ice-ocean, geodynamics and 
natural resources; human impact, governance and geopolitics, arctic societies and knowl-
edge systems, observation and modelling [7]. 
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2. French issues for the Arctic: a strategy under construction
2.1. Limited economic interests
Economic interests in the Arctic constitute the last aspect of French policy. Th ey are 
not mentioned or little mentioned in French policy reports on the Arctic, though they are 
predominant in the background. Th is mainly concerns French multinational companies 
of the oil and gas, mines, fi sheries, navigation and maritime safety sectors [8]. Th ey are 
few, but very active locally, especially in Norway [9]. Norway is the largest supplier of gas 
to France, with a market share of 38% in 2012. In terms of oil, Norway is France’s fi ft h-
largest supplier [10]. Total, EDF (Engie) and Statoil exploit conjointly the Blanche-Neige 
gas fi eld in the Barents Sea. France is the second largest importer of Norwegian fi sh and 
seafood aft er Russia in 2013. Salmon is the most consumed fi sh in France, and 70% of the 
salmon consumed therein are Norwegian [10].
Th e potential opportunities of the exploitation of the natural resources (mines, gas, 
petrol, fi shes, etc.) should be abandoned from the announcement of President François 
Hollande’s proposal [4]. Th e political infl ection of French policy concerning the exploita-
tion of the natural resources can be interpreted as a message to the economic interests 
of the Russian Federation in the particular context of the tensions with the confl ict in 
Ukraine, in addition of the American and European sanctions. Th e same day of the dis-
course of the French Président François Hollande at the Arctic Circle of Reykjavik in Ice-
land on the 16th of October 2015, the President of United States Barak Obama announced 
the end of the oil exploration of US companies in the Arctic. Th ere was also a message 
related to the preparation of the COP 21 Conference in Paris on December 2015.
Of course, the impact of the French position concerning Russian and Norwegian 
interests cannot be ignored. Th e Arctic is one of the major economic development issues 
of development for the Russian Federation — economic, human and territorial, but the 
dependence on Western technologies and investments is high in the gas and the petrol 
fi eld. In regard of the sanctions for petrol, US and European major-players have stopped 
their investments and off -shore exploration in the Russian Arctic. Results of off -shore oil 
explorations are too little; the great majority of oil and gas reserves are concentrated in the 
continental zone of the Russian Arctic territory. Th e off -shore exploitation of the oil and 
gas in the Arctic sea is merely hypothetical under a price of oil per barrel from $80.00 to 
100.00 US, and the potential risks of exploitation, incidents, accidents, and impacts on the 
environment are high. Total decided to stop investments in Arctic oil exploitation in 2012, 
and then in the Russian Barents Sea (Shtokman project). In Russian extraction, exposure 
to hard environmental conditions concerns 25 % of the off -shore platform extraction costs 
in the Arctic. 
Th is political posture is possible because of the small number of French companies 
active in the Arctic (Total in Norway and Russia with gas exploitation, Areva in Canada 
with uranium mines), and the separation of interests between the companies, for exam-
ple, as Total with the French State to the apposition of the British or Russian oil and gas 
companies. Economic and political interactions are strong. Th e British government is sup-
porting British Petroleum actively, incestuous links characterise the relationship between 
Russian oil and gas companies with the Russian Federal State as economic, politic and dip-
lomatic tools. Russia gets 30% of the production from BP (which owns 20 % of Rosneft ), 
10 % from Total, 5 % from Shell, and 5.5 % from ExxonMobil. French economic interests 
Вестник СПбГУ. Сер. 6. Политология. Международные отношения. 2016. Вып. 2 113
are limited in the Arctic, located mostly in Norway, partially in Russia and Canada; costs 
of exploitation are important, success of implementation of this regulation is little ac-
cording to the strong economic interests for Russia, Greenland (Denmark), Canada and 
Norway. In addition, in opposition to the hypotheses of the USGS report in 2008 (10 % 
of World oil reserves and almost 30 % gas estimated by the USGS) [11], the estimated re-
serves of petroleum are from 8 to 10 % of the Global production at the best, with a drop in 
production of gas of 22 % from 2050 according of the Norwegian Statistic and the Centre 
for International Climate and Environmental Research [12].
Ice-melt allows for considering the development of otherwise impossible economic 
activities with an increase in temperature estimated by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
the Climate Change (IPCC) of from 4 to 5 degrees by 2050 [11]. It provides access to sub-
surface resources and sea, opening summer waterways, tourism development, and espe-
cially the gas and oil [11], the exploitation of minerals with new deposits: zinc, iron, cop-
per, lead, nickel, tin, platinum, gold, diamonds, uranium, rare earths. Canada has become 
the third largest producer of diamonds in less than 10 years. Greenland could conceal 
between 12 % and 25 % of rare earths in the World, valuable to the economy of new tech-
nologies and a resource on which China has a near monopoly exploitation. 
Th e opening of new shipping routes in the Arctic Ocean is more complicated: the 
complexity of the geography and the lack of information make it diffi  cult to open the 
Northwest Passage by Canada [13]. Th e summer northern passage by Russia requires very 
large infrastructure investments. China with direct investment or by the project of the 
Russian-Chinese bank of development is starting to contribute in the Russian and Sub-
Russian Arctic regions on the building and renovation of transportation infrastructure. 
It should be noted that Mr. Michel Rocard proposed to create an Arctic Bank of Develop-
ment fi rst. Today, despise the high need of investments, only the Russian Federation can 
propose the full umbrella of infrastructure and equipment for the summer opening of 
the maritime passage. Th e development of the new generation of ice-breakers, the recent 
growing of military presence and the building of new bases can be signifi cant for the sensi-
tive navigation’s problematic of safety and research and rescue. 
2. 2. Scientifi c and environmental issues
Th e policy of France is centred on two aspects: environmental protection and sci-
entifi c expertise. Th e French presence in the Arctic is low because the territory is under 
the sovereignty of the United States, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland and the 
Russian Federation. Th e French implantation is carried out through the establishment of 
international conventions such as the Svalbard archipelago with two scientifi c centres, 
Charles Rabot and Jean Corbel (Treaty of Paris in 1920). 
Th e framework defi ned by the Grenelle 1’s French law of the environment integrates 
the Arctic issues [14]. One of the objectives is “to support, within the relevant internation-
al institutions, the adaptation of international regulations to new Arctic Ocean uses made 
possible by the increasing accessibility” and “exchange of resources and knowledge, to be 
justifi ed, as our main partners [...] as a natural extension of successful cooperation in Ant-
arctica”[15]. Research is seen as the element shared by all global institutional and NGO 
actors, who will make“the right decisions in the region, through a better understanding of its 
changes” [15]. Research and scientifi c expertise are also key-elements for participation in 
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the Arctic Council. Th ey allow a State Observer such as France to provide Member States 
with supplementary scientifi c expertise and requests of the State members of the Arctic 
Council. It is through science and knowledge that we can analyse the Arctic transforma-
tion from a global perspective and remind the challenge of preserving the environment 
through sustainable development. Th e ambitions of the French research in the Arctic are 
limited by the weak budgetary resources. But the logistics deployed are important and in-
creasing with the support of the Institute Polaire Français Paul-Emile Victor (IPEV) sup-
porting each year around 65 research projects [16]. Expertise on two poles is the strength 
of French research with active scientifi c networks. China and Germany are following the 
same policy.
2.3. Geopolitical interests in the Arctic: climate change and global security
France, the United Kingdom, and Germany have long conducted scientifi c activities 
in the Arctic; China is the most recent major scientifi c actor since 1980 [17]. But the stra-
tegic interests of these non-territorial arctic states are diff erent. French policy in the Arctic 
constitutes a part of a French Global policy [18]. To be a driver of infl uence covers the 
energetic interests of the British government [18]; the priority of Germany is to promote 
the sciences and develop emerging technologies [19]; the access of natural resources and 
navigation is an important issue for the Republic of China [17]; fi nancial crises and the EU 
and US sanctions provide a window of opportunity to expand economic and diplomatic 
Arctic interests into Scandinavia and Russia. 
Four aspects structure the French roadmap in the Arctic: global warming policy, ac-
tive science diplomacy among diff erent groups of the Arctic Council and organisations of 
regulation, ecologic and scientifi c with the project of Arctic as a Global Scientifi c Interest 
Zone. Th e question of maritime security and safety is important with the idea of imple-
mentation of high environmental norms including the interdiction of specifi c transpor-
tations in ice-zones — the Arctic sea region becoming a pilot zone for the new marine 
environmental norms. Th e last aspect of the French policy concerns the non-exploitation 
of the oil and gas in the Arctic, and natural resources. 
French interests in the Arctic are related to scientifi c and environmental assets and 
large networks. Th ere are also economic interests with the support of French companies 
in the Arctic, the safety and the protection of French and its enterprises. Th e geopolitical 
interest is high. “Enfi n, en tant que membre du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies, de 
l’OTAN et de l’Union européenne, la France serait nécessairement impliquée en cas de crise 
dans l’océan Arctique, ce qui justifi e son intérêt pour l’avenir de cette région”. [“Finally, as a 
member of the United Nations Security Council, NATO and the European Union, France 
would necessarily be involved in a crisis in the Arctic Ocean, which justifi es its interest in the 
future of this region”.] [1]. Th e geopolitical and diplomatic position of France is de facto 
close to the Chinese notion of a “near-Arctic” country. 
3. Synergies 
3.1. Implementation in European Union Politics
Th e Arctic policy of the European Union has been driven by the French geopolitical 
vision of the Arctic region which combines French and Norwegian economic, environ-
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mental and development issues. Yet this is also incorporated into the problematic of under-
standing, modelling and simulation of the global dynamics of climate change in the Arctic 
and in Antarctica. One of the problematic issues in background concerns the capacities of 
modelling the potential impacts in France and in Europe. Climatic impacts will drive the 
present and future investments of the State in the infrastructures and environmental legis-
lation. France, the United Kingdom, and Germany have a close scientifi c approach in stud-
ies of the Arctic region: to improve the scientifi c knowledge of the Arctic region, in regard 
to Antarctica concerning research on the global modelling of climate change.
Th e Arctic is the main political and economic issue related to climate change for Eu-
rope: evolution of the Gulf Stream, ice weakening, new fi sh stock repartitions, loss of spe-
cies, opening new areas for oil and gas exploration, new maritime transportation routes 
and threats to populations of the North. Th e policy of France, in particular for establishing 
its observer status in the Arctic Council, is (a) to develop the means by which knowledge 
of the Arctic can be applied to environmental challenges and climate change; (b) to con-
tribute to the economic sustainable development of the region based on the sustainable 
use of resources and environmental expertise; (c) to intensify the dialogue with countries 
in the region, indigenous people and other partners (States, administrations and NGO) 
[20], [21]. Over the last 10 years, the European Union has committed over 200 million 
euros to research and development programs (100 programs) in the Arctic region (climate 
change, contaminants and health, infrastructure, environmental technologies, capacity 
building, mapping, space and land) [22]. Th ree projects will also continue under the new 
framework program Horizon 2020: “SIOS-PP”, funded to the tune of 4 million euros on 
observation of Svalbard; “Interact project” with 7.3 million euros to create an interna-
tional research network with Russia, Canada and the United States; and “ACCESS”, with 
10.9 million euros, on the economic prospects arising from climate change. Earth obser-
vation and remote sensing mapping projects continue to be developed and contribute to 
the building of the “Shared Environmental Information System” as a part of the Observa-
tion Network support for sustainable Arctic. Th e contribution of France by the European 
Space Agency (ESA), the major European ESA member, with the joint Earth observation 
programmes is a key to Earth observation and Arctic space monitoring. 
3.2. USA and Canada 
Th e links of the European Union and France with Canada and the United States are 
governed by the declaration on cooperation in the Atlantic Ocean of May 2013 signed as 
part of the transatlantic initiative for marine research. Scientifi c cooperation with Russia, 
despite the Cooperation Agreement on scientifi c research, remains confi ned to a technical 
level. Th e European Union has invested 8.2 million and 6 million euros for the water dis-
tribution in the cities of Arkhangelsk and Murmansk under the framework of the North-
ern cooperation (water management) and Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection (project on 
the prevention and response to crises in the Euro-Arctic Council of Barents). However, 
Canada and the Russian Federation continue to obstruct the entry of the European Union 
in the Arctic Council. Th e European Union is the major fi nancial contributor supporting 
science, economic development by means of three countries are EU members (Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden). Th e role of the European Union is limited as a provider of funds: 
“[…] although it is to provide funds for scientifi c research but not it is expressed on decisions 
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about the Arctic” [15]. Th e future participation of the European Union as member of the 
Arctic Council will have an impact on the Arctic policy.
Conclusion
Th e French policy in Arctic regions is focusing on the impact of climate change and 
its potential economic implications: fi sheries, fi sh stocks, mines, natural resource exploi-
tation (gas, oil, mineral ores including rare earth in Greenland with 12 to 25 % of world 
reserves estimated), building infrastructure (needs of infrastructure are also very impor-
tant), etc., on Maritime security and opening of new summer maritime routes (by Canada 
and the Russian Federation) and self-guided geopolitical and defence interests. Economic 
interests are for the moment limited to Norway, and partially in Russia and in the Canada. 
Total is the second largest enterprise in Norway aft er Statoil. If French policy in the Arc-
tic is driven by the scientifi c interests of climate change and global warming; energy in 
Norway and Russia, security and defence under the umbrella of NATO and the European 
Union security agreement constitute the third face. Th is last aspect is excluded from the 
prerogatives of the Arctic Council. 
Th e French interests of the Arctic directly concern the national level. A large part of 
the impact of climate change on the national territory depend on the transformation and 
evolution of the Arctic and Antarctic climate based on the excellence of the scientifi c and 
academic research on this fi eld. Research into climate change and global warming are also 
concerned with the problematic of sustainable development, protection of the northern 
populations, environmental protection, partnership and supporting the regional dialogue. 
Th e implication of French diplomacy on the secure prevention policy of maritime disasters 
in the Arctic must be noted. French diplomacy is beginning to develop a strategy for one of 
the potential geostrategic regions of the 21st century that must accord with the French global 
interests. Th e policy of France is clearly moving on two levels: the European and national. 
It seeks to develop an integrated approach in opposition to a European policy which is cer-
tainly ambitious but scattered without an overall clear geopolitical mapping. It is therefore 
based on the notion of “conciliation”. Th e European Union focuses on the environmental 
problematic and the development of transport connections and infrastructure in the region, 
including new shipping routes. Th e main question is the position of France in the compe-
tition for the control of the Arctic Sea among the Arctic countries. Th e political status of 
the Arctic actually depends on the diff erent national legislations of the Arctic States and is 
characterised by the absence of international regulation. Th e maritime legislation of 1982 
has not been ratifi ed by the United States. Th e demand of extension of sovereignty up to 200 
nautical miles (in accordance with the agreement signed in 2009 for Norway), by the Rus-
sian Federation (1 millions square kilometres) is a reaction to the geopolitical tensions in the 
Arctic. Denmark is reinvesting in defence and security, especially in Greenland.  Economic 
interests are few because the oil and gas reserves are located on the continent. Canadian and 
Russian policy and territorial claims are driven by internal political questions. Russia has 
developed a regional approach to the Arctic, Canada has adopted a national view. For the 
USA, the strategic interest concerns the opening of a trans-arctic maritime route. France, 
according to the Reykjavik dialogue, defends free maritime access to the Arctic Sea as does 
the United States. Th e issue is juridical, economic and territorial. Canada and the Russian 
Federation are pushing for the inland control of the maritime route by levying taxes. 
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